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PREFACR
This work was conducted-to-provide ahjgber level ofunderstandingofthe P..Otitical
process in one of the Newly Independent Gotmtries - the-Republic ofBelarus. The-
eotJfltries ofEastem Europe and the former-Stwiet Uni6fl, including Belarus are -
undergoing tremendous transformation prac:OOally in any area of policy. The understanding
of these transformations, both-their. extent and-~tiQQ; from post-communist sooiety
such as Belarusian to the demociatic one is-Vital, to. the :future development ofpoliticaI
relationships between the countries.ofthe fOn'Det Soviet block and Western countries..
A review and anaf¥sjs ofinfOrmation'abouf independent political history ofBelarus
shows that democratic transitions are taking place, but very often too slow and not to a
.desirable extent. Belarus itself is not too sign:ific:ant international partner.. however,.. some.
events there can serve as possible model of-events in the NIS countries. Therefore-itis'
important to evaluate the level am:t success-of democratic development in the coumry.
I sincerely thank my thesis committee'-' Drs. Joel Jenswold (Chair}, WilliamParle
and David Nixon - for discussion, guidance and advice in completion ofthis work.
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1. Introduction.
1.1. Prehistory and geopolitical position ofB-eIarus.
Belarus is a relatively small country in Central Europe with the population more
than 10 million, which is lying on the crossroads from Russia to Europe and from
Baltic sea to the Black sea. 'The-eountry acqtIired independence after the collapse-&fthe
Soviet Union only a few years ago-in 1991. Fer the first time after almost three lRmdred
years of dependency on the Russian empire aBd-later the Soviet Union, BeIarusian people
have the opportunity to decide their own fate. As a result there was no tradition of.
recent sovereignty and almost absolute absence of an experience ofmanaging the
country's politics and economy without MoscoW-govemment.
Industrial development ofByelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was one of-the
highest in the former Soviet Union. Belarus had only a very few sources of raw material
and energy in its territory, but the educational level and the level ofperformance in
industry were very high. That's why during the" USSR years quite a lot high-tech
enterprises were allocated in the Republic. They used to produce cars and agriculture
machinery, chemicals, electronic devices and micro chips, radio and TV equipment,
textiles and others. For example, Belarus was third in the world as a producer of
agriculture machines after the USA and Japan [23] and exported this commodity in more
than 80 countries. Because of this, the level of life and the incomes in Belarus were
among the highest in the Soviet Union during this period. However, all raw materials
I
Land 90% ofits energy Belarus was..[ecei~from.tbaJormerSoviet Union republics
mainly from Russia.
As the result of-historical development;:resources and economic background;
independence came to the-pe.ople'of the republic-unexpectedly. It was also uninvited by
the governing structure of former By.elorussia, which was comprised ofmostly
conservative members of the Communist Party. Life in the country changed drastically
after the collapse ofthe USSR. It happened not because of the good will ofthe
government, but because processes outside the country, mainly in Russia and other
newly independent states, made it impossibk-t-0-support the communist regime in
Belarus any longer. Conservatives in the government caused the slow development of
the country toward democracy and a market economy, and tried to support the status.
quo ofa centrally planned economy and communist dictatorship.
1.2. Significance ofstudy.
It is well known that afterthe collapse-of the Soviet Union all newly
independent states claimed their-intention to accomplish democratic transfonnation in
their political life and transition to the market in their economy. Belarus was also among
the supporters ofdemocratic changes. The few years of independent development in the
Republic ofBelarus have shown that the process ofthe democratic transformation is
very difficult.
It is important to understand all ofthe political and economic processes in
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Belarus between the years 1991-19% for tlie.Jollowing reasons.
First, very similar processes ofslowing. political and economic developmeD4.
numerous backups, were taking.place to a ~lentextent in every post Soviet republic,
but in Belarus, as it will be showrrfurther, theyibund the most clear expression, because
of the absolute absence in Belarus nationalistic tensions.
Second, Belarus is lying on-the crossroad from turbulent Russia to Western
Europe. The politics and-eeonOlllY'ofBelams'ean-seriously affect in-the future trade-and
relations between Russia and· the Emopean Unien.
Third, today Be-lams leans heavily toward Russia. As a result ofpro-Russian.
international policy of government and the absence ofviolence in its territory, Be1anJs.
has not yet deserved the interest of the international community, and there are vety.few
serious publications about the country. Actually there is not one review which includes
the most important developments during the last years and whichsuggests some a.nal)rsis
of events.
Because of these reasons, the development ofevents in Belarus was chosen as the
topic of this work. The main areas of research will be the political development and-the
economic situation in the country.
The main purpose of this work is an analysis of the level and success of democratic
transformation in the politics and economy ofBelarus on the basis ofan analysis of
political events and a forecast of possible development ofevents in the country in the
near future.
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1.3. Thesis statement.
1.3.1. Definition ofa scale ofanalysis.
To analyze the level ofdemocratic development in Belarus it is necessary to
consider the events ofpolitical life in the country and to decide whether it is
conservative or democratic. Therefore, it is necessary before further discussion to
define a few major terms which will be used in the study such as conservativet moderate
and democratic. All political events and polit~ decisions will be evaluated in all areas
ofpolitical and economic life in-the context ofthiS work according to the scale,
conservative - moderate - democratic. In political science it is usual to use as the scale
conservative -liber~ but in the case ofBe~ as it will be shown belo.wt this scale.can
lead to confusion, because liberals in the country mostly represent rignt wing of
conservatives view, pro-Russian, pro-communists view ofmembers ofLiberal party of
Belarus. As the result, the following definitions are necessary for further analysis.
Conservative here means- a variant ofa decision or action, which causes the absence of
any changes in politics or economy or the slowest possible changes. Such development
probably will agree with former Soviet approach to politics or the economy.
Conservative in this study in a large part is possible to name as view supporting former
communist ideology. Democratic in this context means any decision or action whieh
agree with the transition to a real legal society, where political power rests on the
people not monarchs and not elite groups, and market economy, which is necessary for
4
development ofa democratic society. A moderate level ofpolicy or political solution
will be the case when democrats are not able to do as they want, but conservators also
nat able to stop democratic development. Unfortunately, it is very diffic:n1t to provide a
more detailed scale ofevaluation.
Section 3.2. will provide a more specific description of the scale. This sca1e'will.
create a background for the unified analysis of the events ofpolitical and economical life
ofBelarus.
1.3.2. Thesis statements.
In the resuh of the analysis it will be pmved·that:
- the level ofdemocratic development ofpoliticallife.in Belarus today is moderate
with a conservative shift. The. new Constitution ofthe Republic provides a very
good background for democratic development in any area ofpolitical life, but
attempting the implementation ofdemocratic-laws meets strong opposition of
conservative politics represented mainly by-former Soviet "nomenclatura".
- the political development in the nearby future will be slow and uncertain as the result
of the strong influence ofconservatives on politic in Belarus, but it will be
development in the direction of further democratic transformation and market
refonn.
- the tendency to join with the Russian Federation will continue to exist and there is a
small possibility of a loss of independence, but according to the results ofanalysis, this
union will be created only in an economic area.
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1.4. Descriptions of the work.
This work will have four chapters. The-introduction provides a background of the
study, significance and purpose of the work, and the thesis statements. The second--part
will be devoted to the literature review. A.1s&, reliability ofdifferent sources of
information will be considered in this chapter. The third chapter will describe the
methods ofanalysis and characteristics ofpolitical life of the country along with the-
variation scale. Next, the most important part, will have analysis of information about
Belarusian political and economical life. FinaUy, a few conclusions will be made on the
possible development ofevents in the future.
However, it is necessary to mention that this work has limitations as the result of
the absence of systematic statistical data about the country and the lack of information
about politics and economy-ofBelarus. This has led to limitation ofmethods analysis of
all available information. Sources of information, used in the study, and their quality
will be discussed in 2.1.
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2. Literature review.
2.1. Information sources.
Belarus is a new independent state which gained it's independence in 1991. It is
a typical post communist society. It is trying to make-ehanges in political life toward a
more democratic society and in-eeooomic life toward a more efficient market economy.
This part will consider tOO information on these topics, which is available today in-the
United States and Byelomsian republic.
It is necessary to mention sources of information. about events in Belarus, and
discuss their quality, because.a few of them, especially with Belarusian ori~ needs
careful consideration. The most reliable information and data are those which have been
found in publication ofofficial organizations in the West. First ofall it is information
and data from "COlmtry Report. Belarus", which are provided by The Economic
Intelligence Unit, a western international organization with headquarters in London and
New York. The main purpose of this organization is to supply western organizations
realistic and truthful infonnation about political and economic development of
practically every country in the world [7 - 10). Second a respectful source is
information and data from the Economic Bulletin for Europe, an international economic
journal ofUN/ECE [40].
Also, it is possible to evaluate the relia9ility of the official Belarusian government
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documents as being very higb,.._when these documents refer to publishing Q legal
.documents and international agreements [22,:3~ 36, 42, 44].
It is also possible to use.a-less reliable information scource ofAmerican's pcrJitical
journals [for example 31, 30, 26; l-4, 16] and-Belarusianeconomicjoumals [20, 14, 15].
In this case, it is necessary to remember that~the authors of these papers are using
mostly statistical information of government ofiieials, which tends to make these
numbers less reliable. It is crucial:-to understand- that during the Soviet Union era,
coverups of important economic and political-information was merely traditional pe-liey
of the Soviet government and "nomenclatur0". This tradition is still strong in Belanls
because of two reasons. Conservative "nomenclature" is still keeping power in their
hands, as it was discussed above, and real numbers of the state economy is so poor, that
the government is still trying to decorate them.. As it possible to see from a few
respectful sources, there are really some differences in data ofwestem organizations and
from the government ofBelarus [9, 40, 34, 12~.14].
Mass media sources were used mostly to get the most recent information about
events in the country, but its' evaluation ofreliability ofsuch information is possible-to
make over time.
2.2. Politics.
2.2.1. The beginning.
Contemporary history ofBelarus began in 1991. The last Soviet referendum about
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preservation ofthe Soviet Unio.ll,-which was.b&tin the March 1991, got support of
83"...11 ofvoters in Belarus. However, in spite of this, the events in Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic developed fas:tly1oward independency. The economic situation was
becaming worse. Significant decreases oftre level of life led to a series ofstrikes i:J:r
April 1991, which interrupted the quiet political life in the country. The strikers tried
to gain an increase in wages. The government; headed by the Communist Party £irst
secretary A.Malafeev and chairman of Supreme-Council (parliament ofBelarus)
M.Dementei, was forceEl-to· increase the wages ofthe workers first time for the
seventy years. However, it was still able to keep-power [3].
A famous Moscow-putch in August 1-9, HJ91 gave a final formal impetus for the
disintegration of the USSR During the first days after putch, such republics as Estonia,
-Lat~ Lithuania and Ukraine officially claimed their independence. On August 25,
Belarus also followed them and claimed its' sovereignty. It happened not because of
good will of the government. Most part ofgovernment officials were conservative
supporters ofputchists. However, pressures of the events were very strong. The
opinion ofpeople, who supported idea of independence, and fear of the government
itself to loose its' power, made the government to take real steps in the declaring of
independence. The Chairman ofSupreme Council, Dementei, who was one of the most
active supporter ofputchists, was forced to leave his post. At the same time the Prime
Minister ofBelarus, Vyacheslau Kebich, along with his cabinet announced the cancelling
of their membership in the Communist Party. Activity ofthe Communist Party on the
territory ofBelarus was banned, and its' funds were confiscated. In the beginning (}f
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September 1991, the Supreme....Council elected deputy Stanislau Shushke..vich, a
representative ofdemocratic fuctionofthe_parliament, as speaker [3,45].
Right after this, also in September the-Snpreme Council changed the name ofthe
state. Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic-became Republic ofBelarus. AJso.-they
Teplaced the state flag and.coat-of-arms with-national symbols. Thus, the formal steps
were taken to denote the sovereignty ofthe state. In the end ofthe year, the
international community fonnall-y-recognized independence ofBelarus: Poland on
September 3, Switzerland on Deeember 23,-the-United States on December 25. In the
first six months seventy countries of the world-recognized Belarus as a sovereign state.
On January 30, 1992, Belarus·became a ffienmef ofthe Conference on Security and.
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). On the 7th ofJuly Belarus became a full member of the
International Monetary Fund and.the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [45].
2.1.2. Political development.
In the beginning in-1991 and 1992 the development ofpolitical events in the
cOlmtry made it possible to understand ifone recalls two moments. The first moment
was the confusion and feeling of uncertainty ofconservative forces, such as most active
of the members ofthe Communist Party and·government. The second moment was
euphoria and the seeming easiness ofindependence for the nationalist democratic
movement, represented by Byelorusian People Fr-ont (BPF).
In 1992, democrats in the country, directed by BPF, gathered about halfofa
10
million signatures in supportofthe.national referendum about the early election ofthe.
Supreme Council (which had been:elected orr~, according the Soviet ConstitutinIr)L
Resistance ofconservators who still had power was too strong, and this attempt to"
reelect parliament was unsuccessful Politica:l-power in the country was left in the bands
ofconservative, procommunist Supreme Cmmcil:
In 1993, there were only a few changes in the political life of the country: Ill'
May a Constitution ofthe country was drafted.: The Constitution was created by
Supreme Council Commission en the basis ef·eonstitutions, ofdemocratic western
countries with the ideas of "democratic legaJstate, a division ofpowers, an independent
court system, and respect to human-and civiI-rights" [31]. Although this draft ofthe
constitution was adopted, the old Soviet Constitution was still in force. The dominant
event ofpolitical life this year was a rivalry between the Supreme Council chairman
S. Shushkevich and Prime Minister V.Kebich.
Stanislav Shushkevich, as chainnan ofSupreme Council, actually was the head of
the state. He was moderate supporter ofdemocratic refonns and ofthe transitionto
market economy. His idea was the· creation ofmodern democratic neutral state without
nuclear weapons and a large army. At the same time, he saw nothing bad in a close-
economic relationship with Russia, and was initiator and defender ofcreation of
Commonwealth of Independent States, patterned on the European Union. However, he
was strictly against any military or security alliance with Russia [30, 31].
Vyacheslau Kebich expressed his politics conservative views offonner
"nomenclature". He supported the independence ofstate, but insisted on close relatiGns
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with Russia and didn't want any significant changes in economy ofBelarus [30t 31~
It is absolutely understandable that parliament ofBeJarus, which consisted therrof
90% ofconservators and only t6% democrats::{mainly members ofBPF) supported-
Prime Minister. In spite of the lack ofsupportirrSupreme Council, Shushkevich, who
had supporters in few key position in the government, was still able to have positive-
influence on the politics ofgovernment. It was-especially important in AprR when the
Supreme Council wanted Shushkevich to sigft-the- Commonwealth ofIndependent States
Security Pact. He refused to dG--it, because·his- epinion signing of the Pact was against
the Declaration ofByelorusian-State Sovereignty (Article 10) voted on 1991 by Supreme
Council itselfand the draft of tIle.new Constitution [29,31]. After this, conservatot:S-
called for "vote ofno confidence in Shushkevich.as chairman.". But with the support of
the opposition Shusbkevich did not leave his post inSupreme Council, because of the..
lack of quorum during vote, even with 168 deputies voting against him [29, 30, 311-
An opinion poll, which was. taken for the first time in independent Belarus, also
showed that most ofthe population supported-Shushkevich. Kebich had a significantly
smaller number ofsupporters. During the whole year he was only in the third position
after Stanislau Shushkevich and representative-ofBPF Zenon paznyak [28]. In 199-3,
Kebich along with the conservative parliament could not remove Shushkevich from
Chairman of Supreme Council ofliee. The rivalry of these two people was merely an
expression of struggle between democrats and "nomenclature" in the society as the
whole. Democrats then had the support ofthe population and trade unions, but
conservator had offices and real power in their hands [28 - 31, 45].
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Another attempt was taken by the opposition and trade unions to hasten the
election ofnew parliament. The.~ conecte<t'Z~thousand signatures supporting election
in spring 1994, one year earlier-[28', 30]. Parliament, frightened with strength ofthis
democratic movement, promisechbat it womcH::e done. But as it will be shown i did
not keep its' promise [30].
2.1.3. Politicalforces in Belarus.
After Belarus gained independence, the Communist Party was banned. Its'
property and funds were confiscated. It left-fi"-ee space for political activity ofothel'
parties for the first time in 70 ~s. Already.in the beginning of 1992, there were about
twenty different political parties, most of them continue their activity today.
All parties were possible.to divide a~ording to their attitude to major problems
of society in Belarus, such as how and where to find solutions ofeconomic crises, levels
of sovereignty and the relationships with Russia.~ Most significant parties with notable
membership were:
Democratic parties that are acting along withBPF: The United Democratic Party, The
Belarusian Social~DemocraticUnion (Hramada), The Byelorusian Peasant Party,
The Belarusian Ecological Union, The Party ofBusinessmen ofBelarus. All these
parties have specific areas of interest, but their political views on major issues unite
them with BPF.
Conservative forces are represented by the Communist Party, which was
relegalized in February 1993 without return ofconfiscated property, Liberal Party of
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Belarus, "White Union". SOIIle.ofthese parties; for example "White Dnio ...~
propagating not only pro-Russian politics, buralso suggest to simply subjugate Belarus
again to Russia [31, 45].
Although there are a lat:ge-nomber ofparties, it is necessary to note that any-of
these parties lacks real support from the population, which is really passive in it poijtical
choice. In 1992, when political life was relatively active, 56% ofvoters "are not leaning
to any ofpolitical forces. "[45].
2.1.4. Presidential electien·of1994.
The situation and relations between poJitical forces in the Republic described
above. It showed that the fight between democtats and conservatorshad no reasonable
solutions. Shushkevich successfully stonewa11ed the Supreme Council attempt to create
a security alliance with Russia. In turn, the Supreme Council did their best to slow
down or prevent all economic reforms favored-by Shushkevich.
This situation came to an end on 16 December when the chairman ofthe Supreme
Council Anticorruption Committee·Aleksnder I:.ukashenlca charged both Kebich and-·
Shushkevich with corruption. Later, in the second halfofJanuary 1994, two Lithuanian
Communists were extradited from the territory ofBelarus to the Lithuanian govermnent.
They were wanted for their role in the death of 14 poople in January of 1991 in ViJnus.
However, proper procedure was-not abided. This incident sharpened the negative
attitude ofthe conservative factioo ofparIiament toward Shushkevich and his supporters
in government, such as Minister ofInternal Affair U.Yahorau, Chairman ofthe state
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Committee for Security (KGB):Leutenant~a1 E.Shirkovski and Prosecutor-General
V.Shaladonau [30), who was responsible forth incident.
In January 24 of 1994,- the Supreme-£ouncit successfully voted for dismissal of
Yahorau and Shirkowski On the-next day-the-deputies used this excuse to recal.hhe
charges ofcorruption against Shushkevich and this- time-he was voted out offoffice;
even in spite ofthe fact that very- few in Belarus believed in the reality of these charges,
according to the opinion ofUstiDa-Marcus- f3G-}. Successor on the post ofChairman-ef
Supreme Council was Mechislaa-Ikyb, a har4-ooBservator and supporter ofPrime
Minister [28 - 30]. Real power in- the state was shi:ftOO to Kebich, who bad almost-
unanimous support of the parliament.
The new Constitution was finally passed in the Supreme Council and became law.
It happened on March 30, 1994. It created-the post ofthe President ofRepublic
Belarus and gave to the President extensive power, although it was restricted by the
parliament. The most important restrictions are the following: first, the President of
Belarus can't dissolve the Supreme Council, and second, only the parliament is able to
announce a state ofemergency in Belarus. Presidential election was decided to be held
on June 23. Actually, the post of the president was created especially for Vyacheslau
Kebich, who believed that with the support of the parliament and mass-media, which was
still controlled by the government, he would win elections without any problems.
Six candidate for president ofBelarus f&FIned two clearly distinctive groups. One
group was the proRussian conser,vators, who differs in their programs but not too
significantly. It was Kebich, Novikau and Dubko. paznyak and Shushkevich were the
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representatives ofindependence-and market refunns. Only two ofthe~tes
represented political parties: Mny.ikau - the:.eammunist Party ofBelarus and Pamyak--
Belarusian People Front. The rest-were independent candidates. The last candidate,
Aleksander Lukahsenka, who stoodapart fromothers, because his election progra:mrrr
tended to be proRussian, but he had young and-resourceful command ofadvisers, who-
represented a democratic way 6fpolitical development [27, 26, 19].
Turnout ofvoters was very-high - 70% and resaks ofpresidential election was· very
quide for everybody in the colmtfy and outside ObseFV@FS. Results are
Table 1. Results ofpresidential election..m.BeIarus in 23 June 1994 [9].
Pr~emtaJ'candidate Party % ofvote
1. It.tukasbetIka: . . independent 45
2. ·\4{ebieh iBdependent 17.3
.
3. LPa..zD¥itk- BPF lZ.lr
4. .--S-.Slmshkevich "independent 9.9
5. ~Dubio- . independent 6.0
6. V.Novilam- communist 4.9
shown in the Table 1 [9]. Lukashenko won with large-advantage over his rivals.
The main points ort1ie programs ofthe conservative candidates were not
distinctively different and·the results ofelection with victory of the youngest and most
unexperienced, Alexander Lukashenka, were possible to explain because of three
reasons. First, it was more ofa protest against old nomenclature candidates rather than
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support ofhis program [9,26]. Second, be'hadyoung, active, and trusted adviso~as it
was mentioned aboove, from the:.post cOIDIJlllliist generation ofpoliticians, who were::-
supposed to stay with him afterthe-victoryas-his-main appointees. Andiinally, bis-'
previous activity as the head Qfparliamentary-£ommittee on Anticorruption gained him
popularity and trust ofvoters r~5; 26].
2.1.5 Parliamentary election }995.
All of the promises made by Supreme-Gooaeil to held parlamentary elections·in
1994 were not kept, andenIy inthe spring·e.fJ995, when term of old parliament was-
over, it decided to held elections.on May 14:.. 1lie first round ofelections. was
practicaUy a failure. It-succeeded to elect less-than-lwfofthe deputies: 119 out o£260
[4). This happened mainly because of the low activity of electorate. In 26 dis~
turnover was lower than. the required 50%. In the rest, candidates did not reach the
required barrier of50% ofthe ballots. It bt:ought a problem to the political life ofthe
country [28). The new Supreme Council could not begin it work, because it did not
have three quarters of the deputies required by the Constitution. President Lukashenko
called to change the Constitution decrease quomm to two fifths [4]. The old deputies
rejected this and decided to wait for a repeated-election in November, alreadyhaving
their sixths year in the parliament. The President called the old parliament illegitimafe-
[4], and proclaimed that he would govern the-country without parliament, although-sliCh
an action ofthe president is against the Constitution. In November, necessary quorum
finally was elected and the new Supreme C{)WlCi! began its' term with 221 deputies-from
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260 [4,32,6].
Together, with the parliamentary electio~.on the same day as a result of the
President initiative and under the Presidenttremendous pressure on the-Supreme"
Council and Constitutional Conrt-a referendnm-was held: The four questions on the
referendum are given-in the T-able-2-. The Supreme Council and Constitutional Court
was against referendum because-it eontained-questions against new Constitution oftbe-
state, according theif opinion, and main purpese-of referendum was Lukashenka's wish
to get more support of the poople ofBelarus-te-use this support in his relationship with
the parliament [5].
Table 2. Results ofthe referendum 14 May 1995 [5].
Question. Answer "yes" %
1. To give or neUe-the Russian language-status-ohtate 83.06
language aJeng--with the Byelorusian?
2. To change the state..s.)'Dibols to Soviet.time s}mbols? 76.3
3. To support economic integration witirRussia)l 82.3
4. To grant the.President.the right to disso1.ve. Supreme 77.9
Council?
On one hand, the results of the referendumwere very spectacular. All the
questions of referendum were related to Lukashenka's initiatives in politics, and
Lukashenko got support on all initiatives, accnrd:ing to the results of the refrendum
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Table 2 [5] shows the questions and the results.ofreferendum. Will it help the President
to reach his political goals or to~solve the prablems ofthe country as he promised ·"itis
not clear. It is necessary to tna:lre:changes intb.e- Constitution and for this the President
needs a vote ofthree quarter ofthe parliament, but because ofhis complicated
relationships with partliament, it is more than-doubtful. As a result of the referendum;
instead ofsolutions to the problems in the ootmtry, Lukashenko added more problems
to political life in the Republic. Using the result-s ofreferendum, after the first
unsuccessful round ofparliament elections, as-it- was mentioned above, he tried t~laim
the old parliament illegitimate and=introduce presidential rule in the country. This aU~mpt
to gain more power did not briag success ~-f4J.
2.1.6. Political life today.
In contemporary life.. ofBelarus, politicaldecision are made by both the Supreme
Council and the President. The direction of-the future decisions ofnew parliam~
which began to work only in December 1995", is not clear yet. In Table 3, it is
possible to see distribution ofpolitical forces in Supreme Council on the 16th of January,
1996 [33]. Communists, as it is easy to predict stand against capitalization of
Belarusian economy and for the close union with Russia. The agrarian fraction
represents a mixture ofpolitical views with-privatization ofthe land and economic
union with Russia. Sociaktemocrats is the-faetion which consist of representatives of
few parties and don't have shared unified program. Civic action· the faction stands for
democratic changes in the country and the market economy, for the real sovereignty of
t9
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Belarus.
Table 3. Distribution of puJ:itical faction iIrSupreme Council [33].
Political faction % ofdeputies Number of
-
deputies
Communists 21.2 4-2
Agrarians 16.7 33
Civic Action 8.1 16
Social-democrats 6.1 12
Nonpartisan 48.0 95
The decisive power is in the hands of nonpartisan-deputies, who are fonning the
largest group in parliament without creation ofany faction. This faction consists IOOStly
from the representatives of technocrats such as directors and top managers of industrial
enterprises and managers ofcollective fanns,- which in the largest part are conservative
supporters ofeconomic union with Russia However, it is possible to see that the
Supreme Council has no majority on a politicaibasis.
The President ofBelarus - Alexander Lukashenka, as a politic and the head ofthe
state, is a very controversial figure. He has no experience ofpolitical work on such a
high level, besides acti~ as Chairman of Committee on Anticorruption. All his life he
dealt with the local level of government. He-has no background or education either in
politics or the economy. Already, after one-year in office, it became clear that his
internal and international policy is erratic and unpredictable [37]. Very soon, almost all
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his advisers from the young command wbich:be1ped him during the campaign and
entered office together with lJJ1rnsbe~ left:bim[25, 38]. Today, his.govemment
consists ofreal mixture ofconservators and democrats.
Political life in the republic-irrthe faftof-l995 became more active. On August-I?,
1995, the strike of the transportation workers-began. The President immediately
demanded to stop the strike;- When, instead ofstopping, striker asked about support- of
other free trade unions andgathered nearthe-trade union headquarters, police made-
arrests ofa few trade tmie&-activists. Lukashenke motivated his actien·with the reason
that the strike was organized: with the help ofWestem intelligence services [36, 39},
Later on September 23, the President pu5lished a decree "On Certain Measures-to
Ensure Stability and Law and Oider in the Republic ofBelarus", which banned the
activity of free trade unio~participationof.strikes and put restrictions on the deputies
immunity. But the decree, which..cased negative reactions both in the country and
abroad, was overruled by the Constitutional Court ofBelarus as contradicting the
Constitution and international law; such as the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights:
At the same time, Lukashenko uses his usual methods dealing with Belarusian mass-
media. Few newspapers came out with white spots, because ofcensor actions. Few
other newspapers, which were representing the oppositienpress, were closed [1,2,24].
Some ofthe chief-editors were removed by the personal orders ofthe President
Lukashenka. These actions really banned the image ofdemocracy in Belarus in eyes of
foreign observers, and a representatives of the European Union expressed their worries
about political situation in Belarus.
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2.2. Security and military polic.y:
After the collapse ofthe-Soviet Union-Belarus~ along with Russia, l:Jkraine and-
Kazakhstan. inherited nuclear weapons. However~ attitudes toward this issue was-
different from the rest ofnuclear republic. Bemus clearly claimed, in the very
beginning~ that it will be a military neutral8fld-mtclear free. The Declaration of
Sovereignty said: "No military tmits ofothel'-eoontries, their military bases-anti
installation shall be deployed <>B-the territory-efthe Belorusian Supreme Counei1. The
Belarus sets the aim ofmaking- its-territory a nOOIear free zone and ofbecoming a neutral
state" [43~ 45).
With creation of CIS~ ther.e was an attempt to create a common security council-
so called "Consul ofDefense Ministers oftl:ie-CtS". Belarusian representatives did.nnt
agree to participate in this COUDell with the motive ofnot to provide any legal basis
which can be used against the country's neutm:1ity. It is necessary to note in this
connection that because of geo strategical position ofBelarus~ it had on it territory about
240000 servicemenofthe-furmer Soviet troops. According to Shushkevich's
evaluation it was the largest in the-world concentration oftroops: 1 serviceman for 43
citizen [45). With the idea ofneutrality, Belarus needs in it not more than 60 000 army.
With idea ofnuclear free zone, it was necessafY to remove all nuclear armament from the
territory. According to the-Lisbon-agreement-between the USA and nuclear republics of
the former USSR which was held on 1992, Belarus must destroy or transfer to Russia
all strategic nuclear weapons [45, 46]. On Fetiruary 1993, Byelorusian parliament
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ratified START-l and the No~ProliferationTreaty. Also, it was announced that
nuclear weapons will be removed from the territory of the republic until the middle of
1995 and Russian troops had to go back to Russia at the end of 1995. Necessary steps
were taken to reach this goal- to remove Russian troops from the territory ofBelarus.
In spite ofmany attempts to make Belarus part of the CIS Security Treaty, which
is actually a security treaty with Russia, up to-the end of 1995 Belarus still did not
participated in any security or military agreement. After the removal of Shushkevieh;
the CIS Collective Security Pact was signed by Belarus, but with two provisions, which
Russia-still did not want to accept. This Pact was oot ratified by Russian Duma in 1995.
Belarusian parliament, however, refused to sign the- Russian variant ofagreement, where
the issue was that the Russian government had right to place military division on
Belarusian territory without asking for the permission of the Belarusian government or
the Supreme Council. TherefOI~e...up to the beginning ofyear 1996, there was no
military union between the Russian federation.and Belarus [29].
Dismantlement and transfer ofnuclear arms, and Russian troops was being
accomplishing more or less according schedule, but with Western help. That is why-the
attitude in the country toward nuclear weapons-was quite different from that in Ukraine,
which was trying to use nuclear weapon as the mean ofpressure on the international
community [29J. However, at the same time with usual proRussian tendency in the
parliament, and with the purpose to get cheaper oil and gas from Russia, Belarus agreed
to pennit Russia to use a few connnunication and the radar station on the territory of
Belarus and also granted pennission to use Belarosian airfields for 130 Russian aircraft
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during the next 25 years [11].
2.3. Chemobyl.
There is one additional issue in Belarusiarrpolitics and economy, which is
impossible to avoid, while speaking about BeIams. It is the Chernobyl disaster, which-
happened in 1986, five years-before independenee-, but it still bas tremendous affect on all
areas ofcountry life. Abeut·70%-ofthe radioaGtive fallout contaminates-30% oftile
territory ofrepublic. AGOOrding to evaluatioos-ofBelarusian specialists and
government, the total economic damaged reached 16 annual budgets of the republic
[17]. Every year after independence, Belarus-must spend from 17 to 20% ofGNP on
t:he-Chemobyl cleanup, medical benefits, aodliealthcare [13].
After Chemobyl, when the. size ofecological disaster became clear, the
government of the USSR claimed that it woutddo anything to prevent the bard
consequences ofthis catastrophe in Belarus·and:Ukraine. After the collapse ofthe
former Soviet Union Russia, who took responsibility for the USSR debts, repeated that it
would help Belarus with necessary amount ofmoney. This promises were practically
forgotten and Belarus was Left without any help, except for a small charitable programs
in Western European countries, such as Germany. These programs provided mainly
medical devices, medicine, and educational courses in Western hospitals to help
Belarusian specialist to deal with-the health problems, caused by radioactive
contamination. The number ofpeople, who live in the contaminated with cesium 137
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territory, according to the most modest evaluation ofBelarusian officials is about t.g:;,
2 2 milJion, and among them.ar.e-440,OOO chi1dren [17].
Besides, direct economic effect, Chernohytbrought to Belarus widespread ~gative
attitude to all nuclear power. 'fhis-phenomena'Stnmgly affects energy productiorrirrthe
republic. In the middle ofthe 80s, there was planto build 80 kilometers from Minsk
another nuclear power plant, which-could provide- energy for all Belarus. After the-
Chemobyl the building ofthis plant- was stopped; and later when it became clear that-the
energy crises led to economic disaster even Belamsian government bad no courage-to-
discuss nuclear energy as alternative to Russia&oil and gas. However, in last ye3f-4De
intention to solve energy problem-with the lieIp.o:fa new nuclear plant was expressed.
again. There are a few claims ofgovernmeDtat officials about the plans to build, with
the. help ofFrance and Germany, a nuclear power plant_ Yet a reaction ofBeIarusian.
people is not entirely clear [16]
2.4. Foreign policy.
Belarus, as it was mentioned in the introduction, is placed in the geographical
center ofEurope. This geopolitical position, between East and West, has defined
foreign policy ofthe country. However, while discussing the international relations of
Belarus, it is necessary to remember that historically it was, and still is, tied very closely
to Russia and the other Newly Independent States.
Belarusian government and politicians bad no clear understanding ofwhat is
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foreign policy and what place BeJams takes in the international arena.. In reallife~t
happens that during almost four year of independeDC4the Byelorusian Supreme Council
never considered Byelorusian fOIeign policy. Besides the occasion when the foreign-
policy of the country were touched-while discussionufsuch issues as disarmameIlt'ar-
signing the START Treaty the .government ofBela:rus· did not define the main princjplt
offureign policy. In theco~ it looks like Belarus bas no foreign policy at allllftd.all
international relations are driven·by external forces or-everyday needs connected with-
foreign loans or international tFaOO E41].
Even today, Belarus llas no qualified dijOOmats in.foreign ministry and in some
Belarusian embassies still workiDg Russian diplomats [18].
Sti.14 there are few agreements on cooperation and trade with such Western
countries as Germany and the United States. Still about 30% ofthe trade is a share of
Western and developing countries. (Belarus has trade with 96 countries), but such
agreements of action look more as incidents than a regular foreign policy. A volume of
trade with the world is $1.5 billion, which sounds ridiculous ifcompared with Belgium,
which has the same population, but the volume of its trade is $50 - 60 billion [41].
A little different foreign policy ofBelarusian government has to do with Russia and
other CIS countries. Belarus is merely too dependent on the Russian supply ofenergy
and as a result, besides a very few occasions like security treaty Belarus usually is taking
similar with Russia position in the foreign policy.
The best relationship Belarus bas with the neighbor country ofPoland. The
volume oftrade with Poland actually takes the second place after Russia, and first with
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non CIS countries. There are a tot ofdifferent links not only governmental whic,h are
tieing two oountries together.
In conclusion. it is oniynecessary to note-the two important points in Belarusian
foreign policy with its neighboring countries. F1rst, Belarus claimed in the beginning.
that any arguments about the common borders will be solved only on the peaceful~
ofmutual agreement. And actually, there were-no serious conflicts on this issue, even if
there were some problems, especially with bit-hHania and Latvia [45]. Second, there-is
n& ethnic problem either in the country with-fewminorities ( 13% ofpopulation in
Belarus are Russians, UkraiRians, Poles and smaller national groups), or in the
neighboring countries with·those Belorusians-who.are Jiving abroad. There are, fot:
example, 240,000 belarusians in Poland [19J.
2.5. Economic policy.
2.5.1. Economic background.
The economic situation ofBelarus in the-funner Soviet Union was not too bad if
compared with most of the republics. It was-industrial-agrarian country with a
relatively new, post World War IT, equipment and technology. GDP was equal to
$60,325 billion and GDP per person $5,900 in the year 1990 before independence. It
was a typical Soviet command economy with centralized control over everything,
which failed in competition with the Western world. Disintegration ofeconomy in the
USSR began long before the real political collapse and it was possible to see this in
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Belarus also, because industry W$ in very large pmtied to the rest of the Soviet
linion industry [9].
Still it was possible to call Belarus an industrial republic, because with only a
population of 3.6% from popuhrtion of the-USSR, Belarusian industry produced, for
example, 11.2% of lathes, 22.5% motorcycles, 14.2 tractors, 11.3% refrigerators,
11.6% TV sets, 26.8% synthetic fiber and 18-.2-%-mineral fertilizers [45]. Belarus was
the third largest producer of tractors, after~USA and Japan [23]. In agriculture;
Belarus was more or less self sufikient, besides-fulits and wheat.
In spite of the satisfactory state ofecooomy) theFe were a few very important
factors which could affect and aflected in reality state ofeconomy in independent
Belarus .
1. Overdependence on the import from other republic-ofthe USSR, mainly from
Russia, raw material andenergy.
2. The combination of centralized command economy and strong military-industrial
complex..
3. Subordination of 54% of industry in Belarus to Central government in Moscow. It
was the largest and the best part of industry [45].
Existence of these factors led to the decline of the economy after independence
as a result of the breaking of economic links with other republics, collapse ofmilitary
industrial complex and inability of the conservative government to provide efficient
market reforms.
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Table 4. Main indicators cfBelarus eeonomies--[40**, 44]
Ecooomic indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
-
(Jan-July):.
GDP at market price -955.0 H,OOO40.1 '79.7 " ..
.(Rb bn)
- -
na na
-
, .
-
NMP at market price 29,510-- . 6"2,633 780,048 "9;000
-
.,.
(Rb bn) na na
.
-
Real NMP growth .. -32:, ... .;r.9 . -1'0.6 .. '-1.1..6
% c- ' -9.6 .. :-l6.6 -20.0 - 12
••
..
-
..
Consumer price 4.5 . -81.5 1,016 1,188
inflation I- l-,l-90 2,221 1,945 ..
% •• .
-
."
Population 10.28' . --to.33 to·.3~' 10,40
m
.
Exports 19,OOlf 38,300 350,000,'
,
,(Rb m) na na I
Import '19;SOO-·· ..40,100 400;()()(}
.
(Rb m) na na
• '" Economic Bulletin for Europe
na - not available
29
2.5.2 Independent economy.
The economy continued to decline:the first ~earafter independence imtin:"l9,t
and the beginning of 1992;- itwas still possible to-get"energy sources, particularlroit
and gas and some raw materials with relatively cheap-prices, and therefore, the level-of
GDP, industrial production-and inf1atio~ was tolerable: However, even in the
beginning it was necessary to- take decisive steps in the transition from centralized
command economy to the-market to provide future-normal development of the
economy and to prevent- fi..Hth.er decline. The spooiBe numbers which illumat~
conditions of Belarusia&eoonomy in lastyear bef9re iDdependence and four-~s after
possible to find in Table 4.
This time, as it was described above, the power in the state was in the hands of
proRussian government. They thought that it is possible to continue to have Russian
support for the needs ofBelarusian economy, to have cheap a energy source from
.Russia and huge Russian market to sell Belarusian goods. They hoped that it will be
possible to maintain the status quo without the market economy [45, 31].
However, economic development in the neighbor countries including Russ~
who had taken steps to a real market, did not leave any choice to the Belarusian
government. It was forced to make some changes in the economy, such as changes of
financial syste~ privatizatio~ opening market, but these measures were undertaken
when it was impossible to avoid them without risking to brake relations with Russia or
such organization as IMF and with extremely slow path [31, 10,40].
It is necessary to note that there have been no serious measures to overcome
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economic crises. Instead, intlatian..bas changedinto hyperinflation, industriat.
production has continue to decline,:.agricultme:a:bnost collapsed [7 - 10]. A-slower
decline ofthe economy is possible-to see onty-itrJate 1995, but systemic numbers fur-
this period are not available yet
In 1993, the economic situation became worse. Industrial production fell
16.3% during first half ofthe year-. The intlation-leveHncrease up to 30% per month
in April and 40-500tlo in October [31, 23].Beeause ofthe high energy prices,
Belarusian production became BeBCompetitive 00 the Russian market, where 80% of
goods were sold earlier and it has-nothe acc@ss-to other markets. As a result, the level
Table 5. Main parameters ofBelarusian economy in 1995 (according to
European ffWletin [40]).
Economic parameters First half of First halfof
1994 1995
1. GDP-(o/ci change) -10 -12
2. Gross ifttittstrial-ootput (% change} - 9.6 -11
3. Dnemplo)!DleIltr.ate (%) 1.8 2.3
4. Consumer-prices-(% change over the same 607 193
period)-
5. Current accoom-balance - 253 • 169
($ min)
6. Flows offoreign investment 5 5
($ min)
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of life in Belarus dropped substantially. !fto compare with the averageincome in..
1'996, which was approximately $3:600, in. the:.end: of 1995 incomes of87% of
populations were less than $I()OO-~33]. It.islIossible to see the main parameters
which are descnbing Belarusian- economy in1he-first half 1995 (January - September}
in the Table 4 [40].
It was especially relevant-m- problems with energy supply. Belarus depends- on
the-import of energy on 90%. It-always received oil and gas from Russian sources,.
When the Russian economy began-transformation te-the market, it became impossible
to continue purchase ofenergy with subsidized priGes, Also, there are problems witIi
the declining ofoil production in Russia. The Russian government prefers to take.care
about the needs ofRussian economy or to sell oiland gas to the West for hard
currency. As a result ofthis the needs ofBelar.us.are not satisfied in full volume. :For
example, with the needs of economy Belarus has to get around 22 million tons ofoil
In 1992 Belarusian economy got 1.4 million less. In the next year it got 5.5 million
less [22]. Even such amawrt ofenergy supply Belarus can not payoff. Every year,
huge energy debts are accmnulated (on 1 August 1995 the size ofdebt for gas was
$460 million, according to [34]). Partly they are paid by barter, but with the lack of
Russian currency, as it will be discussed below, with the lack ofother hard currency,
Belarus has some serious difficulties. The severe lack ofenergy supply led to the
decline in every sector of industry and especially agriculture. As usual, the Belarusian
government make an attempt to solve this problems with the help ofeconomic
agreement with Russ~ instead ofdevelopment any other solutions. It also uses those
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loans, which are provided by I:MF and governments ofaur Western countries fo:r the
development ofthe Belarosian.:economy [221=
Reasons ofsuch unprofessional behavioroffiefarusian government are very
clear. Those, who had some knowledge amtwantecl-to- do something with economy,
had no power. Those who had-power, did not·know how and did not want to make-
any changes. They have waited-and are waiting· now for economic salvation from
Russia. However, the Russian Federation does n&t hurry to help, especially on
charitable conditions. It is necessary to pay and the Belarusian government is trying to
pay with the sovereignty oftbe·oountry.
2.5.3. Economic and monetary union with Russia.
The hope that the Russ.ian government will help providing cheaper energy than
on the world market ofraw material found its expression in the idea ofeconomic union
with Russia. This idea gave way to the initiative: in creation ofthe Commonwealth of
Independent States. But CIS economic uniorrdid not work the way that the
Belarusian government hoped for (and any govemments offormer Soviet republica,
who joined CIS). Additionally in 1992, pro~ began with Russian ruble. Trying
to stop inflation, the Russian government restricted amount ofRussian ruble and
brought with this measure a severe shortage ofmble to Belarus. This, and the attempt
to continue subsidizing ofgoods in Belarus, leG to introduction of so called additional
temporarily currency, wlOOh was printed by the Belarusian government and was in use
together with the Russian ruble. However, the Russian· government considered that
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the existence ofsuch double currency wouJd"Jumn the Russian economy, and in July
Im carried out financial and cmrency reform... Belarus had to think about its own
national currency, but old hopes-gave a wa:y:ta the idea ofa monetary union with
Russia, which stopped the development ofnational currency and led to use of
temporary currency up to date. 'Fhe tempormycu.rrency immediately began to drop-m-
value. If in August 1992, a dollar cost aoom-39- ruble, in 1993 - 2,730, today
(March 1996) it is already 11,500·(7 - 10, 23}. In spite ofthe separati&n offinaneial
systems very soon it became c1eaf. fur the government that practically permanent failure
to pay for energy needed some ·semtions. 1lle.S9lutions they saw also in the monetm:y.
union with Russia. And, in Sept~mber, the· Belamsian Prime Minister Kebich andtfle
Russian Prime Minister Victor Chemomyrdin signed an-agreement on a new type or-
ruble zone within CIS. .This agreement was.almost unanimously ratified in Noveniber
1993 by Supreme Council. Buttbis monetary union still is not implemented even
today. The reason is that both government contdnot reach consensus while discussing
specific issues ofthis union such as level of sovereignty over financial decisions of
Belarus. Stanislau Bahdankevich, the chairman of Belarusian National Bank, and a
very influential politician argued that Russian terms ofthis merger were absolutely
unrealistic and could destroy country independence. The main Russian condition of
"the ruble zone lt creation was that only Russian government had to be able to decide
what amount ofrubles had to be printed and only Russian government can regulate
such financial parameters as interest rates and exchange rates. In tern, Russia also did
not want to create "the ruble zone" with Belarus on Belarusian conditions with
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motivation that such action wilt seriously harmB:ussian economy f9, 21].. And today
the' situation with the monetary union is not:more clear. On one hand such a uni.~n is
desired very much by conservators'and olct"nomenclatmeU, on the oth:erhand, suctr
union on Russians tenns contradicts-to contentof the Constitution of the Republic of
Belarus [44]. The events of last year showedit-js not so easy t.o change the'
Constitution even with majority- inparliament.
According to commentary- of Western specialists, "The bid for monetary Ullit>n
with Russia represents an open-rejeetion of economie reform" [9].
The last joint adventure with Russia is the Custom Union between Russia, Belams
and Kazakhstan. This agreement became the first agreement which actually begin to
work. It assumes the cancellation ofcustom trade barriers on between Belarus aDd.
Russia, similar principles and prices with other countries and unified regulation of
international trade in both countries. Also, it supposes existence ofa similar
mechanism of regulation ofmarket both in Belarus and Russia [42].
2.5.4. Privatization
In spite ofattempts to support status quoin-the country economy, the Belarusian
government forced by circumstances to begin changes toward a market. The
Constitution of the country contains all necessary laws, which are necessary for market
economy. The Constitution provides equal-opportunity for any type ofproperties,
including private, which was im~ssibledwiBg the Soviet times [43, 44]. It states
against direct government regulation of the ~no,micactivity on all levels, as it was
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during administrative-command economy, permitting only indirect measures such as tax
and interest rates regulation. However, the- Eanstitution does not specifY those types"
ofproperty, which can be held by private owner:s. As a result, the government of
Belarus, began real privatization only in yearo1993. It refers to privatization of
industry. The State Program ofPrivatization supposed that already in the end of 1993-
a number ofprivate enterprises in Belarus would be 10%. But today it is clear that-the
government is not in harry with-privatizatiOft. -This 10% (140 privatized industrial
enterprises) was reached only up- ID the beginning of 1995 [20].
The privatization ofthe lan4is accomplishing even more slowly. A very streag
lobby in the parliament, represent.ing collective~ provides serious restriction on-
this process. As the result, preference in buying a piece of land will have a collecthce
farm. The amount of land in one hand will be restricted by law [44]. The Belarusian
government has the requirement.ofRussia to provide the same level oftransfonnation
ofeconomy, as in Russia, this is condition ofeconomic union with Russia. Also, it has
the requirement ofthe International Monetary Fund about the necessary for loans level
ofdevelopment ofthe economy. These two reasons are pushing the government to
privatization, liberalization ofprices, liberalization ofimport - export operations,
transformation ofthe financial system, suspension ofsubsides to inefficient enterprise
and collective fiums [34].
2.5.5. International trade.
With the collapse ofthe Soviet Union almost all economic links between
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industry in different republics hmke..down. The-economy ofBelarus was in great.need..
ofrenewing these links and esmtilisbing newo.IJe. to provide its economy with energy:
raw material, consumer goods-ami to sell its-production to get incomes in hard
currencies.
Belarus today is an active participant on-the-international market, but it bis
Table 6. Foreign trade-e-fBelarus [14].
Data Source Export Import
1992 19-93- . }.994·· 1992 1993 1994--
1 Goskomstat trade data
Non-CIS countries 1.,061 715 398 751 747 26-9
CIS countries 1,262 1,002 494 865 1,142 571
2 Balance of payment (IMF) ..
(-National Bank)
Non-CIS countries 1,082 838 477- 741 996 539-
CIS countries 2,489 2,108 691- 2,462 2,303 918-
:3 ·Share ofCIS in total trade
National Bank 60.8 59.0 59.1 69,9 61.8 63.0
IMF 69.7 71.6 n.a. 76.9 69.8 n.a.
4 Share of trade in GDP
National Bank 68.3 49.6 n.a. 65.2 63.4 n.a-
IMF 88.3 71.6 n.a. 79.2 80.1 n.a.
1,2 data in $USA (conversion from Belarusian rubles was made by [39])
3,4 data in %
n.a. - not available
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necessary to develop this participation further. Itisfult.member ofGATI. In August
1994, it receives Most FavorectNation (MNF)~status-fromthe USA. The share in
foreign trade ofBelarus for Western countries about 30%, and about 70% is share of
the fonner Soviet republics. However, it is necessary to note, as it was discussed in-
[14], the access ofBelarusian producers to the European market is very often limited
One ofthe reasons is a limited qoota to export from Belarus. Especially it is possible-·
to refer such phenomena to export offertilizers on the European Union market.
The share of Russia is 83-o/&- of CIS trade IllOst-ly responsible for import in BeJams.
gas, oil and oil-products and raw materials. Belarus are- paying for these commodities
with barter, which consist ofagriculture rnashinery, TV-sets, friezers, chemicals, meat-
and vegetables. Table 6. shows-roreign trade efBelarus in years 1992-1994 [8, 14}.
From the collapse of the USS~ there are GIlly small changes in the fo-reign trade
structure ofBelarus. To get access to Western market it is necessary to have prodUcts,
which answer the main requirement of this nw:ket - quality. Main products which
are exported on the West and also in CIS co.untries are the same. It is chemicals,
machinery and transport equipment., fertilizers and food. In the Table 7. products of
export and import are shown [14}.
To create favorable a climate for investment, including foreign, it is possible to
reorient the country more toward West, using geographical position ofBelarus and
cheap workforce. Today, with proRussian policy ofgovenunent, it is too early to
speak about such opportunities [14].
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Table 7. Product structure of import and export in Belarus [14].
..
Export-t9-· Import from
NOIi- Russia . "€IS-&- Att- Non- Russia crs&: Aft.-
ers lJalbCs COUnlr. CIS Baltics COlInlr
.J- Mineral products - -H,6 3.8 ... H.I -19- 3.8 70.1 6.8 3"..
2 Chemical products ~ "'32.4 3.5 Ll 12.6 18.1 2.1 1.7 . 'Z:~.
3 Textile &textile articles 12.8 18.1- 15.9- . 1-5.9 3.6 1.7 7.3 ·3·;2·
4' :"13ase metal & ..
metalproduct 1.7 3.9 ·4..9 -S...4 3.6 12.1 26.8 1--l..5.-
5 Machinery &equipment, , -
I
..
'.
electric goods "7.2 21.1 ,14.0- 15.0 27.7 6.4 12.3 1-4:4
6- Vehicle & other transport-
equipment -itA· 35.4 -25.6 25.4 2.4 0.3 0.8 l-;t
7 Instruments & apparatus . '.1.9 0.9 .. :0.7 12 1.7 0.0 0.0 .0..0.
g. Vegetable products ft.7 0.1 ft.t 6·.3 18.1 0.1 26.2 to-.1
2.5.6. Economy 1995.
It is possible to make a little sUlllDlafY ofthe state of the economy up to date.
According to the requirements ofboth Russia and Western financial organization., the
Belarusian government, in 1995, created the. Program of urgent measures of
overcoming economic crises in Belarus. This-program is supposed to work during an
eight month period and has the main purpose of stop decline of the economy. Thus, it
has to slow down the fall of the industrial production, to decrease the inflation level to
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the 10-11% per month (compare.with 40-5.0% per month 1992 and even more in 1"99"4
[36J), to increase level oflife ofB:elarusian.populatiorrf3,6]. The results ofthis'
measures are more or less sufficient, according to ftelarusian sources [34]. -Decline of
the country economy continues; but the rate of decline-is substantially smaller: GDP-
has fell to 11 %, (in 1994 it was 28%). With deregulation ofprices on agriculture
production decline slows from 14% in 1994 to 3% in 1995 [12]. The level of inflation
up to March 1995 was higher than expected, but after March, as a result of-the
stabilization policy ofBelarusian National Bank decr-eased and in June was 2.5% [34}.
Still there is a long- way to real improvement o-Ahe Belarusian economy with
really efficient measures. First, it is necessary to stop- the government subsides ofweak.
and nonprofitable industrial enterprises, which still have been used, even in 1995, and
to enact the law on bankruptcy. Second, it is necessary to basten the privatization of
.industry and land, to provide a.real basis for the market economy. Third, it is necessary
to improve the financial system with market.taxpolicy, with more freedom ofbanks
with credit and interest policy, which can help:inthe solution of financial problems.
Forth, it is necessary to change-investment·poJicy to give possible investors better
conditions [12, 34, 36].
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3. Methods of research..
Two questions are necessary-to discnss befu:re::the analysis ofthe coJIIttI:y-
politics. First, it is information and data available fromused sources. Second; a
method ofresearch, which is possible to use under circmnstances.
3.1. Data.
In the beginning, it is-~rtant to-mention that the topic of the work defines
data sources. All data, which are d.iscussed=in-het:e, are secondary data. Limited aooeS&
to statistical database ~tfie country does oot~pennit the use ofstatistics of the
Belarusian government, for examp1e, on themonth1y base.
Another important notion, which needs. special discussion, is amount ofdata
and information on the politics.and.economics, available in all these sources. As it was
mentioned the main purpose ofthe work is to review the democratic development of
the Belarusian policy afterindependence. ltinnnediately gave serious restriction on
the time period. It has been less than four :yems of independent development.
Information for 1995 is not ready yet, and not yet published. Only a few numbers
are available for the first halfofyear. Evenifto-·add last year of the USSR - 1990 f6'1'
the comparison, it will be the statistics maximumfor a five year period. All data,
which were possible to find, are gwen on a YeaE~ basis, because there are no available
sources of statistical data on the monthly basis; except a few with not more than 3-4
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month in row.
All tables with secondary data are desc::rjhed in tbe:Jiterature review as-part. of
the work, which is providechwa-backgroumtinformatiorrsource fOT further analysis-of
democratic development: The table ofcha:racteristicsofpolitical development ofthe-
country is presented here. Also, it defines-conservative - moderate - democratic
development for each ofthe-ebaracteristics--area ofpolicy - used for the analysis.
3.2. Method of analysis.
As one can see fromtbe-r:eview, data avaiIaOIe from different sources puts
restriction on the possibility- to appl~ real numericatstatistical analysis. The availaDle
data on political events o"f-tbe.couDfry pern:iiLonly events analysis, because there is.
practically no numerical information in this area. The few data on the economic
situation in the Republic BeJarus~enable us to: provide only very restricted descriptive
analysis or comparison of similar data from yearto year or so-called descriptive time
serials analysis. These data- aremrly able tu-sbow how the situation, with specific
parameters, has been changing- in these recent-)'.ears.
However, to rely only on these few more-or less systematic numbers is not enough;
As a result, this work will also show a analysis &fevents on the basis of the available-
information on the discussed topics.
The events analysis is the method, whiGh-is.possible to use for the analysis of
nonnwnerical infonnation, when it is impossible to apply statistics. There are a few
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rules, which make it possible with "the help ofanalysis ofevents, to .get scientific~.
Such an analysis pennits us_ to repeat a simi:lar::stndy by other independent. researclIer
with the same outcome.. l'u use"the-events"mm:lysis in om case, when it will be mo:stIy-
analysis of information orrthe political process-irrBelarus, it is necessary to define
specific areas ofpolicy, which will be chosen for the analysis and the rules ofevaluation
"o-fevents related to this specifie-area ofpolicy.
In our case, when we deal with the pelitieal-process (any considered:- areas of
policy connected with po-litiGal process, SUGh-as--pelitics, economic poliG.y; security-
policy, international policy and~ ()n). All events used- in this study for,. analysis 9f
level ofdemocratic developmem.m..Belarus-are descR'bed in Table 8. Nine main areas
of the country political life are-used for analysisjn the study. Every area-ofpoliticsJs
possible to develop in conserva.ti.Y.e.direction-oc.democratic, as it was defined in 1.32-
In Table 8 for all areas a specific scale ofconservative - moderate - democratic
developmen is given. In the areas ofpolitics ofBelarus, it is possible to see how
balance ofpower between the democratic opposition and conservative "nomenclattJra"
is defining this or that political events or decision. For example, this scale for the
characteristic of "Sovereignty or independence" "gives as the conservative development
a full sized union with the Russian Federatioftofrone end of the scale, on the other fo-r
democratic development fully developed independence ofthe country in all areas of life
including economic independence.
Actually these it is the most important part of study - the analysis ofthe events
in each ofthe nine areas ofpolicy. Ifto app}¥-tbe scale conservative - moderate -
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democratic for similar areas ofpolicy in ano_ther countIy ofthe Eastern Europe, it.will.
be- possible to define a-according:-level ofdemocmtization in this country tao
Little is about the rules- of analysis" in tire texts of reviewed sources. First of
all, there is a set ofpolitical-events ofpolitical decisions for every area, which is .
described in literature review. In the next part these-events or decisions will be put on
the scale with intermediate-eonclusien how, aeeoriling-to the scaling ofevents possible-
to evealuate this area ofpolicy. In this conneetien, it would be useful to repeat the
deffuition ofthe scale, given in 1.3.2. Here conservative means such political views-or
decisions, which supports the· fumler communist regime, slows down the democratic
transformation and market refunn and opposes sovereignty ofthe country. Demoaatic
means political views or decisions, which support independence ofBelarus, full scale
democratic transformations. and..market reforms. Moderate means partial political
changes and partial market refurms with preservationof some features of the previo.us
regime, such as social guarantees and state property for selected subjects of
Bclarusian economy.
On the basis ofanalysis ofevents in altthese areas ofpolitical life and
economy ofthe country, it is possible to make-conclusions about success of a country
policy or evaluation ofpossible development- in the nearest future. Such an attempt to
define, what tendency a conservative or democratic will prevail next few years, will-be
made in the last part ofthe work for the case of the Republic ofBelarus.
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Table 8. Main parameters. ofcontext analysis ofpntitics in the Republic ofReIams:
Parameter .- eonservative ". Moderate Democratic-
1. Sovereignty or Union with Russia in- Economic coopera- Full independence-
independence .. an..areas, possibJe..OIi "tion with Russia, but
..
;he-level of federative . sup_port of more or
..
"feptlbJic ·Iess independent
-
--
status
2- Human rights -Restrictions on the Respect to human Freedom of~'
freedom of press, Fights, but possibility mass commUftiea--
..
.. ..
..r.ig6ts for ofoccasional, not tions, respect. to
demonstration, SYs:rematic -human riglrts-
~eful protest _oDduct
..
3. Legal basis for democracy : Agree that it is .Law as the main basis Creation ou.eal legal
necessary, but "ofthe country' life, basis for democracy
pl'acticing Soviet style ·but level of and all actklns-of
"i.m.derlaw act" democracy lower government or any
other group or person
on Iy accorGing to the
law
4. Security Military union with I-NeutraHty, but respect Neutrality and·ban on
Russia and existence to such powerful any military activity
ofRlIssian military neighbor as Russia ofanother state in
bases on the terri- Belarus
tory of the country
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5. Foreign policy -. Absence of Systemic an:d-
independent feFeign- ·lndependenHereign - -
~licy .policy equaLreJations
-
with all partIJers'
6. Market economy D9-oot believe-in MaFket economy but Decisive aDd-fast
..
:... m..arket and oppose.. Wi1:Ii..stroog state _transition to market
_.
"capitalizationlloftbe . regulations -economy
..
..
~try economy
7. Energy . T'o'get cheap oir-lID(J- . "Russian sources, but To find alternative
gas' from Russia at the-same time sources of~gy and
attempts to find smth avoid in the future so
· else, still not very full dependency on
.-elear-wbat namely one country-as-source-
of raw material and
I
I
energy
8. Privatization ·As low level of ·Level of privatization Privatization of.
. .
private proper.ty. as ·with-large part oftbe industry and-land
possible state property with the purpose of
-
creation of-market
economy
9. Foreign investment Unvaforable Necessity to attract Creation ofcondition
. condition for feretg&- foreign investments, in the countf'y, whicb
investment. Fear of but to keep own will attract private
capitalization of interest ofBelarusiao foreign investment
. economy through producers
investments.
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4. Politics of the Republic oflJ.eIarus.
4.1. Conununism or denRJCIacy. -
The- most interesting questions appeat'"'while watching the development ofevents in
the former Soviet Union: "What is going OftfiHhe country? Is it possible-to name-aH-
changes during last four - five yetlfS-as demeeFatle changes? Or is it merelyadaptati&n-of
the old regime to crises in ecooomy and failufe to-win-military and ecooomic competitie&
with the West?"
Here an attempt will be made to evaJu.ate level of-democratic development"oo. the
example of independent devetopment ofBeIarus.. It was mentioned already that Betaros
atypical for the NIS country in1he..sense thaLther.e is no ethnic conflicts and, on one.band,
it may not be easy to make the comparison of-:B.e.tarus with other republics, but ontbe
another hand, transitions in economy, politic.s;Jnternational relations are not shadowed
with ethnic problems.
Let us consider the level ofconservatism-democracy according to the scale 'defined
in 1.3.1 and specified for every area ofpolitical development used for the analysis-in
Table 8 in 3.2.
4.1.1. Forced sovereignty or.. ?
What is possible to consider, first of all, as the most important political factor, which
affects all areas of the policy. It is the main law ofany country - the Constitution of
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Belarus. According to' ttre...eonstitution,....which was shortly describedJn.2.J .2. anlttt 4.,.
the-Republic ofBel.arus.is.1IIlindependentcountry..··1.t:was recognin:d:as a sovereign state
by almost all countries-inthe-world-an<tthe-most respectful intemationaJ-organization.
Nobody can argue witlrthis statement-and-no outside-force, according-intemationaHaws,
can change it. However; analysis of the-events shows that in Belarus two-point etfviews
ooexist . First, as it sh&ws-m- Table 8, the conservative view, which calls to the as elesest
union with Russia, and possibly including-monetary, military and in otfter-areas. The-flght
wing of this view propagat~ the joining 0-£ Belarus-·ro·Russia as part ofRussian
Federation. A moderate part-ofthe politicians calfs-.fur a economic union with Russia,
.excluding monetary or military. The democratic part. wants equally beneficial relatiOOs.
from both the West and the East. They prefer the-situation where nobody can dictate to
the Belarusian government Russiaor the Eut:opean Union.
Let's consider the main political events from this point ofview
1. The agreement about CIS, when Belarusian chairman Stanislau Shushkevich
became one of initiator of this tmion. The CIS agreement, however, did not
suppose to create an other Soviet Union and it was not a threat to the country's-
independence. Therefore; with-the participation ofBelarus it was possible to
evaluate according to the scale-as moderate development, because on one hand, it
is not subordination ofthe country to the Russian Federation in any form, and Oft·
the other hand it is not equal partnership with Russia or Western countries.
(moderate)
2. As the result ofpolitical devek>pment, as it was discussed in 2.1. today Belarus
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bas signed a military or sec~unionwithR~but this agreement is not ratified
yet and looks like it is oot going:to happened in-near:future. The reason-
conditions on which Belarus' carragree-orr such wtion do not satisfy the Russian-
requirements - Belarus has no--intention-to pellltit the Russian govermnent to
decide what military bases andrwhere on the t~oryofBelarus R~iawould
have. It is also possible to-refer- as moderate devel:6pment, because the agreement
was signed by Belarusain ptlfliament, but-mt-in-the form, which wanted
conservators. (modeFate)--
3. Economic union with-Russia-.
a. Monetary union. Again, BeIarusian governmeat-iS- willing to have su£h.
agreement very nmc~-but they still have- 00 monetary union. The reason -
conditions which Russia inclUde in the corresponding document, that Russia
will dictate the Belorusian financial p<iliq~ The head ofNational Bank of
Belarus, Stanislauwas Bagetankevich, was-able to prove that it was a threat for the
sovereignity of the state. (moderate)
b. A recent custom union is-actual1y first wurk jug agr.eement with Russia on mutual
economic issue. There are few points;--arit is shown above, about the
international trade, which is possible to define as a step back from independence:
And today, it is sooner conservative agreement, because there is an item which
define the creation ofcommon foreign trade- policy together with Russia. That-
means mainly that decisions-will be made in Moscow, and this is restriction for
independent Belarusian poliey. However, this union began to work a few mooths
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ago and it is not easy..mevaluate it properly -(lDOllerate-collsenra.tive.
4. -Problems in the area offoreign policy are described::ahove. Snchforeign. polic.}Li.s-
hard to characterize asforeign pulicy--ofa respedfutsovereign state. This is $a-a
negative feature in the:issue of independent existance ofBelarus. However, itis
still too much to evaluate-this charcte.istic as-orrly-conservative, merely becal.lSe1U!
to date Belarus has weak, proRussian;-but still inde.pendent foreign policy.
(moderate-conservative)-
These few evaluations give-a pieture ofpoJities which is possible-to name-:as·the
moderate with a consel"VatiYe trend. Contemporary-Belarus is really an independent-
OOWltry but with the eJtistence of tendency to proRassian policy and a small, but pessible
chance to loose its' sovereignty.
4,-1.2. Democratic laws.
The Constitution again. is the background ofany legal activity in the country.. It..is
necessary to note that the..Constitution ofBelarus_.itseJfgives all necessary basis for. the
creation and implementation ofdemocratic laws:
However, if to cons:i.der-available infonnation-frotn different sources, it is importa:rrt
to mention few points, which have been described already in 2.1.
1. The Constitution provides democratic prine.iples ofdivision ofpowers and
an independent court system. The Constittttional Court is created to observe how
any laws or actions ofthe government ofother groups in the country are agreeing--
with the Constitution. It looks pretty~ ana democratic, especially in the area
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ofthe relationships between'the executive..andJegislative branches.ofpower. When.
the division of the power in::t:be...country'ieads:the fact that the President Lukasbenk:a
and the Supreme Council prevent each 'otherfrom concentration too much poweri:n
one's hands. This is real democratic de~elopment, especially if to compare with-
communist dictatorship duringthe Soviet~. (democratic)
2. The most democratic achievement, if to eomparewithprevious communists years-
is democratic elections ofa-president, parli8ment-antl-Iocal government It is
necessary to note that by ebservers from ether-countries elections really named-
free competitive democratie election witft.~ opportunities for all eandidates..
Still, there is a negative feature~,when the candidate, who has power before
the elections, can ha¥e better access to mass- meaia, for example, but this problem
not ofdemocratic elections.. {aemocratiq"
3. However, there are .rewJac~which mate this-prettydemocratic picture much
darker.
a_ First ofall, it is possib~ to use po\\'"ef for pressure on court or parliament to get
unconstitutional politicat-ontmme. Om:ejt-ba., taken place, when Aleksander
Lukshenka formulated questions for refetelldwn on 14 May 1995. These questions-
were recognized as unco-nstitatiunal by the-partiament and the Constitutional
Court. Another time it washap~ when the President published antistrike
decree, which was also recognized as unconstitutional, but which was active for few
month. Today, however, the decree is invalid. This phenomena is hardly possible
to name as a funy democratie developmem. (moderate-eomservative)
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b. Second, the extent ofgovernmental conuptioIL:If:government officials are not
keeping law and order, hoW1hey can expect that::a usual citizen will not do" tre-smne-.
Bribery is a widespread phenomena in Belarus today: It was admitted by-
parliament investigation. «(;OUsel vative)
4. The existence ofso called ondellawact , which were traditional during the Soviet--
Union. It means that there-is-tbeConstittttion; there are-the laws and at the same
time there are govemmenta:l--oftieial doeuments, which are devoted to interpretation
ofone or another speeifie issue; which is--oot·discussed by the ConstiMion andthe
laws in details. Very often,-tfHS. underlaw acts-lead to a direct distortion ofthe main
democratic laws. One of the specific examples.will be discussed later in connecticm
with privatization. (conservatiw)
5. And.lfualIy, there is very important notion-about the real independence ofthe court
system in Belarus. It really claimed to be independent. Appointment ofjudges from
the top to the lowest positions do not depend on-executive power. Still the situation
is impossible to name..absolute.ly independent, because the court system depend on
exec.utiyes with court buildings~with judges apartments, with some specific
conditions in their lives as access to som~extra benefits.
Overall, it is possible to- see that Belarns bas a democratic Constitution and-
democratic laws, democratically elected parliament and the President, but implementation
is difficult. Some political: development in t-his area is also possible to name a moderate,
because conservative forces are trying to keep-the- democratic laws from democratie
implementation, but the main laws are still defOOGmtic.
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4.1.3. Human rights
Again, it is necessary to begiILwith a basD:.-~.with the Constitution. In1be
Constitution ofBelarus it is possible to find-attthe regulations and provision about human
and civil rights :from Geneva Convention. L-et's-consider the facts, which <ml!-can show
observance ofthese regu.lationsin·.~ coUIIt1:y.
1-. Freedom of press. Ifin thebegimling ofthe-independent history ofthe ootmtry
publishing ofa newspaper or magazine E1epeftded only on available amount &f
money, today the situation-has-Ghanged alRady. It was mentioned, in litefatme
review, a few very ilIustratlve--examples,-whea.Lukashenko enforced the dosing of
opposition newspapers or applied censorsmp to some publication, when.
progressive newspapers. came out with wh1te.spots on their pages. This-is ha.rd1¥
possible. to see as a demoCf.aC¥and observance of freedom ofpress. It is a return.
to the old communisrtimes. (conservatixe.}
2. Rights on the peaceful demonstration or protest.. The famous scandal with
Lukashenko antistrike decree and the arrest offew representatives of free trade
unions, which have caused -vivid-protests ofinternational community. It is
not the single example, it is only the mostfamous one. Again, it is possible to see
the conservative type ofpolitical behavior. (conservative)
3. At the same time, in comparison with the'most former Soviet republics, positive
development ofthe observance-of rights ofethnic minorities, such as citizenship,
language, schools, and cultural developrnem. Citizenship can get any person who
lived on the territory ofthe republic for one year. Nationality is not included in a
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new Belarusian passport, whicb..is the main documentfor citizens Nobody put.
an ethnic or language restrictionin job application. Parents can choose the Jangrrage.
of the secondare educatiorrand-school fOI then children. In large-cities, there'iS"-a-
variety of schools such-as-potish; Russian;'different religious communities.
(democratic)
4. People are free to express-1heir religious-beliefs and to visit the church-or religious
community oftheir choice;··Dming the S6viet. time, the state did not intervene 1ft-
religious business, lmt open propagatiofr0ff'eligious beliefs was feFhidElen by the-
communist ideology and religien activity· was-strongly restricted by the state
regulations. (demoeratic)
These examples show-tlie serious restrict~n such human rights as free&m of
speech, press, and on the freedOm-of opposit1OO, which.are used today in Belarus.
However, it is possible to describe. human rights development as democratic in
comparison with the communist.past. Again, it comes sooner to the moderate.
d.eYelopment of policy in this ares, because some'facts and events are purely democratic
and the other are typical for the old communist society - conservative.
4.1.4. Security
The security or defense issues were mentioned before. These issues are clo~y
connected with sovereignty, which was discussed in 4;1.1., but they still have independent
significance in the policy ofthe state.
1. Nuclear weapon - it is the most interesting·isSl:le for the outside world. In this
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sense, everybody has an interesr-in theftelarusian.Bpproach to solut.io~·
a. Belarus claims itselfthe nuclear-nee state'an<tmilitmyneutral After:the USS
race ofannament ibs without any doubta:d:emocratictrend. (democratic).
b. Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol and tlw'freaty START I aboutthe-transferaf
Russian Federation or disrnautfulg ofst~c-nuclearweapon. The-largest part-J18s'
been done already. Also the-transfer ofthe-army subordinate the Russian Federation
to Russian territory has been done almost-in-full. Few tactical missiles and anny
which still are left Ofrthe tet=ritefy, howevef, eause some trouble. In the Fall of
1995 the President LukasheAka-ordered-the-stop ofthe transfer to Russia.
Actually, his main motives we.fe. differe~s·inattitude toward Ubaiae waving
nuclear weapons and attracting-because ~attention ofintemational coIDIllUllity.
The action ofLukashenko was·not the action-ofa serious politicians. However" as
the result of this action, it is.notclear that=Behlrus today is already a nuclear free.
state or it will still have nuclear. weapon..inside its bo.rders. Overall,.tb:e fact that
Belarus shows serious irrtention to became-nuclear free state and acts accordingly
giving evidence of d:emocraticapproach to such important issue. (democratic)"
2. The military union with Russia on the basis'of CIS security agreement, as it was
shortly mentioned in 4; 1.1.which was signed by representative ofthe Supreme
Council ofBelarus is possible retreated as a conservative move, but it is neces~
to remember that as it was mentioned in part 2.2. according to this agreement, only
the parliament of Belarus has the right to decide it is possible to place any foreign
(Russian) troops or equipment on the territory ofBelarus. It is unsatisfactory to
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the Russian military command-and government that this agreement is stiltno.t
ratified by the Russian DllDlR.-. Also it irimportant to -note that this agreement did
not suppose any joint military -action on""the- tenitory either Russia, Belarus'urany
third country. (moderate)
3. The creation ofthe-army-ofthe-Republic-ofBelarus, approved by the parliament-of
Belarus will have a number of servicemen-reasonable for such a OOWltry asBe~
tfO,OOO-officers corps-and between 70,900-800 50,OOO-servicemerij and: is intended
to be used only for the-proteet-i6nofBelams-mside its borders. (moderate)
4. Military bases and ettwp1Ileflt;-·However·,-- pres5me o-f events, the mostly economie
Bature and pressure-Gfthe Russian gOVennneBt led to a decision to permit Russia-
use equipment oftwe-stations and one ll'liIitaF:y base on the territory ofBelarus ror-
25 years, which is step-back.:lIG-ID the intended neutrality. (coDsen'ative)
After the consideration of aU. these facts, it is possible to see that. in compaRSon
with the previous state, today Belarus is mucli..more democratic in the sense ofsafety for
the neighbors and the world and the presence. ofweapons and armies on its territory. It is
possible to evaluate it as a moderate step forward to democratic development.
4.1.5. Foreign policy.
As it was described in 2.4. Belarus was recognized as an independent state by the
international conununity, but it did not take active steps in its foreign policy, carrying
relations with different states only occasionally not systemic base.
1. Belarus still bas a few higWy qualified diJ.>lemats, who can provide the necessary
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relationships with intemationatpartners-:on the. high-level The government takes.
steps to improve the situa~ such as the creatinn.ofthe Department of
International Relations in the BelarusiarrState University, but such-action will give-
results only in a long run. ffthere are changes; 'these-changes are very slow.
(moderate)
2. It looks like many Belarusian officials stiH-fear-open relations with foreign
countries, overestimating at the-same time the importance ofrelationships with
Russia. It is possible-to seein--the behavior· ofthe-President himself: when a few
times on different occasions-l1e-Fepeated-ekioommunist formulas about capitalists
spies or about the action ofwestem intelligence sel=¥iee ( about strike oftransport
workers). Such a poiRtofvie.w is impossible t-o-sca1eas progressive or democratic.
(moderate-conservative.}
3. Diplomatic relations with the main Westem-countries including Germany, the USA,
England and other, participation in the International Organizations such as UN,
UNICEF, IMF and others, tbe.exchange of official visits of the President of the
United States, Bill Clinton, of the Supreme:-Council, Stanislau Sbushkevich, are
possible to relate as the::positive development in this area ofpolicy. (democratic)
Actually, it is not easy to evaluate-tbis area ofBelarusian politics, because-of the
nonprofessional nature ofthe Belarusian foreign-policy. There is development, but this
development is going extremely slow and s~s the intention to have foreign policy
directed sooner to the East than to the West.
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4.2. Command or market.
4.2.1. Market economy?
As it is recognized by everybody in the world including the fonner Soviet cowrtties,
communist style command cent!alized eco~failed in-the competition- with the·market
capitalists economies. Also, it is widely koowft-that to have a working economy it-is-
neeessary to change traditional-86"viet ecooomy-to market one. It gives·next characteristic
of the country policy. -The highly-and successfully developed market typiGal for the
democratic countries ofihe ~st., So it is'·pGsSi5le to say that ifthe poIiGy ofBeIams-·
transforms it economy to a market pattern,.. it-iS..positive and democmtic development. If
it has very slow changes and stayS.practica1ty centralized - then it is tlie.conservative.type
of behavior.
t. The subsidies for industry were .practically pennanent. during the lastfuur years .
This measure, instead ofhastening economic transformation, keeps the old Soviet
style enterprises on their reet and strengthens theirreliance on the center. The
same is possible to tell about state and collective-farms. Because of the reliance on
the central government, the-efficiency ofwork is very low. However, the last
Program of the government on economic stabilization supposes that such
subsidies will not be used any mere and that-finally the law on bankruptcy will be
applied to industrial enterprises, which are·,flOt. able·te work without subsides.
(moderate-conservative)
2. Inflation was up to 1000% per year in 1994. Last year, 1995, inflation dropped
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significantly to the m.v.e.L-ufabout1iO - 1ao.e-Icl per.:year That means...the
stabilmltion ofthe Belat asian cmrency reJativ.dT-dnltaJ: value. However:, it is
necessary to note that-i:tisnotthe stabilization ofptices on the internal marke of
Belarus.
(moderate)
3. High taxes on industrial production. This government policy initially was intended
to get more money from industry and btJSiness to cover government and social
expenses. But taxies were umeasonably high. Such taxies, usually instead of
money, are able to bring tr-oOOles with the-absence of investment and decreasing-&f
productions. Very high inter.est-rates in Gredits distribution for independent
businessmen and extremelyfii¥Orable credit-regime to state owned plant and
factories., which made.-them.not. to work more efficiently, but to ask-fur more
credits. Such economic polic..y led to 5W.&i-dtop in industrial productio~ in
comparison with the last year ofthe SovietUnion. Sure, it was possible to wait.
recession during such unprecedent transformation ofeconomy. Mentioned abo.ve,.
the Program on stabilization" supposes to cancehft-mvorable low interest
governmental distributed credits, but the-decreasing ofinterest rate for the rest-of
credits with the purpose to revive credit-activity in-the country. (conservative)-
4. Government measures to protect the internal market- with artificially kept low priees
from neighboring countries led, instead ofproteetIDn the market, to huge losses of
raw material sources and markets for Belarusian production. (conservative)
These measures are possible to describe not as a transition to market, but as the
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policy ofsupport of old traditionattype ofproduction conservative type ofpolicy
4.2.3. Where to find energy sorm:w?
It became clear from-z-.,S-;, that one of-the-largest economy problems in Belarus-is-
the problem with energy. Where and howto-find-it, how to pay for it - these are vitat
questions for Belarus. Let's takea-look onthe-aetion ofgovernment in this area oftx>"licy.
1. To buy oil and gas in Russia-with: priceslewef-than werld prices. The-govet'lUllellt-
ofBelarus with the puFpOse to-get lower-priees permitted to Russia to use
practically free oil ana gas pip@liDes co~Russia and Western countries. :The
price of transportation ofoneDarrel ofoiriUIiree times cheaper tmm.in-neighlxn;.
Lithuania and four time less. than in Poland: Practically the same is.with railroadS.
and roads transportation ofRnssian goodS.to~.the.Western countries. Besides, the
Belorasian government practically sell t\'lLLtb:e.:largestin European part of the ml1Def
USSR refinery in Novopot.a:tsk:and Mosyrto the Russian government Agreement
on this topic tells about 50-SO split ofownership"oftbis refineries. According to-the
calculations of independent economists from BNF, ifto use this money directly-it is
absolutely possible to buy oil and gas with-wodd prices on the world market and
the policy of the government sooner speaks about conservatism and traditional
mentality, when Belarusian government traditienally relied on Russian sources.
(conservative)
2. The absence ofattempt to tum to nontraditieBal sources ofenergy. That is
understandable on one hand, because the gG-Vernment has no money for large
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projects, but it is always possible to make.jointprojects with France.o Ge~as.­
it was discussed above. (conserutiv '
3. Besides in the Belarusian press;-a possible altematiYe:'projects were described. -tme
ofthem, the most realistic, is-baiiding ofan oihransportation sea pod in Northerrr"
Poland on the basis ofjoint venture with-Bela:ros-:' A corresponding-agreementW8S'
signed by Poland and Belarus~' Other similar enterprises with Ukraine on the Black
sea are attempted, but this project did no~ get the-recognition ofBelarusian
government. (moderate)-
The energy policy is als&1'6Ssible to characterize-sooner as a traditional or
conservative rather than progr-essi¥e or democratic in the policy development in Belaros.
4.2.3. Privatization.
One ofthe most important characteristics of the. market economy is the levet:o.f
privatization. It is impossible even to speak about market economy when all indu.str¥.
farms, lands and forests.are..the..state property. To create a market, it is necessary10
abolish the state monopoly. 1lr:privatize iminstry and land.
1. The Constitution ofthe Republic ofBeIarus-states on-its pages that besides state
and collective property, the same rights has-any type ofprivate property. But the
Constitution does not specify what type ofproperty can be private. It creates
definite problems whi:le-the-proeess ofprivatization occurs in the country.
(moderate)
2. Industrial privatization began in Belarus in 1993. It was decided that privatization
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would be a voucher - type. It -Will pel'lIli.t1o:. those who was work.ingJhere, to~
plant or factory to. This afso-.will pel mil to:create, according to the..initial id~
stock market in the country: However, irrthe beginning, as it is described in -
review of literature, attemps ofprivatization;··as it appears, are much slower thmrit
was supposed to be. Up to-the-end of 1995; only 10% ofthe industrial enterprises
were privatized. This level is less than satisfaetory for the quick transition to a-.
market economy. (moderate e6ftservative)
2. Land privatization. The-.idea-that- the land-eaa.-be bought and sold is still-very hafd-ro-
understand to the gove11Ulleflt-e-fBelarus.·As..a result, the law about land
pr:l¥atization passed ooIY- in 1994, and it-passed with serious restrictions. FavombIe
preference for buying-]mQ. is for those people. who are working in theagric~
today. The land with.asquare-more then..tliectare, which is not used.for
agriculture production,. can be confiscatedoI resold. The amount of land which.tbe
usual citizen can buy with. the purpose tD..1IDi:b:l house or for other pw:poses besides
productive, is restricted to 0.2 hectare. (mode:n.te-coDservative)
It is necessary to note that-with the ctIIItemporary high prices on agriculture
machinery and very low prices on agricultural production, including meat, milk. and
vegetables, there are very few fanners who take a risk ofbuying a large amount ofland for
production. Laws about private property on lands in the contemporary situation are not
working as many good laws still need to be implemented in the country.
Ifto try to make the evaluation according scale, it is necessary to say that "yes",
in comparison with situation duriag the USSR, there is significant progress in the lawson
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private property. HQwe.v~the-implementationoftheseJaws goesso,stowlytbat it is.
possible to speak only. a.boutthe.:canservatiYI~:JIPJn:oach to this area of'poJicy.,
4.2.4. Fareign investmenr.-
There is a.Imost no data-about the 2lmOmt of foreign investment-in Belarus,
besides a few numbers in-the Beont>mic Bulletin-efEttrope. It is not easy to discuss-1his
area-ofpolicy. Still, it is possible-to tell that-the-politieal and economieal risk ofthe-
unstable situation, financial pelicy-such as aeBGeBvertability ofBelarusiaB·currency, tW(
policy, when taxes are to higfi-fut-any investment-, absence ofraw material as it is ill
Kazakhstan, difficulties with oomenclature -bw:eaucratic local level of government hardly
can lead to increase of fureign-investm.ent.
However, the last measures of tIle. Program of stabilization with changes-in.
financial and credit policy with-state. insurance polic.y for riskiness of business in the
country with decreased tax levetcan possibly attract more investment. The future wilt
have to show.
4.3. Conclusion.
As the overall conclusion ofthis analysis, it is possible to say that:
- The development of polky in t~Republic ofBelarus is possible to de·fine as a
development in the direGtiGn of democratic transformation ofa postcommunist society
towards a real democracy. Some characteriStiGs ofpolitical life in Belarus, such as legal
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developments - the Constitution, election:laws.- private.:property~ priY.atization of.
industrial enterprises amttmds, neutrality anetthe:removal ofnuclear weapons and:::the:
Russian troops from the-territory ofBeIarus;-shows a great democratic development:""
- However, the extentofdemocratic transfolDmtion and specific political decisions-of
parliament and the government during years--l-99-1 - 1995· is necessary to define as-bemg
eooservative-moderate almost in any area o-fpoHey. The transfonnation in any area O'f
politics is slow and foreed-by outside forces-.
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5. Forecast.
1. The.main conclusion ofthe context amrlysis ornvailable somceris ilia any
changes in Belarus are slowand uncertain'and-political decisions and actions are possible-
to characterize as moderate-conservative: 'f~er,with the deSCIibed above peIsonality .
oithe president ofthe country, Alexander bukashenko, and the distribution ofpolitical-
forces in the parliament, which were described in 2.1, it gives the picture ofpolitical-
deeisions in any area ofpoliGy, which suppesedly will be-more conservative than
democratic, but still with a slowDlO-vement-t&waFd further democratic transformatiea.
2. It is possible to recall from paIt 2.1 that~al forces outside parliament and the
government represented mainly-by. the weak-aiKt.sparse political partieS-aDd trade uDioIIS,
which by themselves are not aOIe. to, create areal opposition to the government, it would
be very plausible that the main a1f.ect on politica.llife ofBelarus will be on the govemment
and parliament. Mainly the. government and".t:he..Supreme Council will have the decisive
voice in any political or economical issues, independent of popular opinion and support.
3. These two points can'lead to closer relationswith Russia, especially, when the ·next
Presidential election inRussia is held with thethe victory ofthe Russian-communists',
who, as they claim, care less about the economy and financial disagreements with-Belarus
and more about the renovation of the Soviet Unioo.
4. Overall, Belarus in the next- few years, until the next presidential or parliamentary
elections, will have less stable, less predictable policy than ever before with the tendency
to form union with the Russian Federation and mestly conservative political solutie-es.
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5. As for the development of.the...co.untry after..tbe.year 2000, there are. too many outside
characteristics, which is necessmyto take mm:account, such as development ofevents:in
Russ~ relations of the Russian Federation-witlrthe Western countries, if the connnwrists
in Russia will win elections and- SO" on.
However, it is necessary to-note one difference between Belarus and·the rest of
Eastern European and NIS countries. If inRussia, after the relatively democratic I'tlle-&f
the President Yehsin, the possiblity that communists will be back, according to the-similar
scenario ofevents in Hungary and· Poland, i&-very high. At the same time, in Be1am5-
democrats never had power. Any changes iatlie-country is impossible to name deIllGGr-atic
in the sense that they were made by the representatives ofnomenclature and old So.viet
style Supreme Council. As the. last .presidentialelections showed (part 2.1.), a candidate of
the Communist Party got tb.e..least.'iotes during the elections. Howeve~.communistfaction
in the parliament is the second. after. the nonpartisan deputies. There is a small possibJity
ofthe opposite to the P"olish scenario ofpolitical development in Belarus, this will-be left
to the next elections in 1--998 - 1999.
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